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Small states have always been more vulnerable in the global economy. This is so
because trade comprises a larger proportion of their economic activity, and because they
lack the power to set the terms or make any of the rules that govern globalization.
Studies of small states tend to focus on the nature of their vulnerabilities, without
considering that these countries have managed external pressures in different ways.
Globalization brings opportunities as well as risks, and a more integrated global
economy may enable smaller states to adapt quickly to changing conditions, and to
more readily pursue strategic development policies.
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Introduction
Small states have always been more vulnerable in the global economy. This is so not
only because trade comprises a larger proportion of their economic activity than it does
in large states (see Table 1), but because they lack the power to set any of the terms or
make any of the rules that govern globalization. Yet studies of small states tend to focus
on the nature of their vulnerabilities, without considering that these countries have
managed external pressures in different ways (Amstrup 1976: 176). Moreover,
smallness need not always be a liability. Globalization brings opportunities as well as
risks, and a more integrated global economy may enable smaller, more ‘nimble’ states
to adapt quickly to changing conditions, and more readily to identify and pursue
strategic development policies. The key question then becomes: Under what conditions
does smallness become a liability or an asset?
Drawing on a unique data set on governance, growth, social development, and
inequality, we examine various hypotheses about the reasons for the development
performance of small developing countries in the 1960-98 period. We define small
countries as those with populations of five million or less in 1998, along the lines of
recent research by Collier and Dollar (1999). We also examine, using case study
evidence, a subgroup of countries that share the same medium-high rank in the
Commonwealth Secretariat’s ‘Composite Vulnerability Index’. We argue that although
they tend to be equally exposed to the risks and opportunities of globalization, small
states differ internally. In particular, different histories and strategic choices have built
different sets of institutions in small countries, and these institutions affect how
globalization is mediated in each country. Having explored these issues as they pertain
to both large and small countries, we then seek to discover whether we can identify
institutional differences that distinguish small countries that are successful at making
sure that their citizens benefit from the foreign investment and trade opportunities
provided through globalization, from those that are not. Our primary findings can be
summarized as follows:
1. The differences between small and large countries are real, but concentrated in
relatively few variables. Small countries experience more volatile growth rates
and are more aid and trade dependent, when controlling for regional location, the
initial level of economic development, the rate of growth, and a number of other
variables. Small countries are clearly more vulnerable to rapid fluctuations in the
fortunes of the global economy.
2. There are no significant differences between small and large countries in terms
of the quality of their institutions. However, precisely because small countries
are more vulnerable, the quality of their institutions matters even more than it
does in large countries. Put another way, high quality institutions in small states
matters more in terms of managing already high levels of globalization (i.e.
helping to sustain high growth rates and low growth volatility) than in attaining
additional levels of global integration. We show that small countries with high
quality institutions of conflict management and state capacity have less growth2
volatility, and that those with stronger state capacity in particular are more likely
to enjoy higher rates of economic growth.1
These results have important implications for business groups and the international
development community. Small countries have traditionally been highly dependent on
trade, but investors seem to be indifferent to the quality of their institutions, which are
so important not only in their own right but instrumentally for maintaining economic
(and political) stability. Of greater concern is the fact that while aid donors are
accurately targeting poor countries, their funds to small countries appear to go to those
with institutions that are significantly worse than those who are less aid dependent.
While this could be read as a good thing if aid dependence was indicative of funds
going for institutional reform, a more plausible—and troubling—explanation is that
considerable sums of aid money are being wasted in small poor countries that do not
have the institutional infrastructure in place to use it effectively. Closer attention to the
institutional environment in small developing countries is likely to help both stabilize
and increase growth rates, and thus make an important contribution to poverty reduction
and social concerns (such as health and education).
We structure the paper as follows. In Section 1 we review some of the literature that has
explored the economic, social, and political differences between small and large states,
and then consider the possible reasons why some small states might be able to manage
the risks and opportunities of globalization better than others. In Section 3, the heart of
the empirical analysis, we use regression analysis to test some of the arguments
submitted in Section 1, focusing on institutions at the state level. Section 4 explores
three case studies of small, vulnerable countries in more detail, to demonstrate how
some small countries embarked on a path that led them to develop the kinds of
institutions that seem to make a difference in managing globalization, while others did
not. Section 5 offers some conclusions.
1 Is small beautiful? Small states and large states
How do small states differ from large states in ways that might be relevant for
understanding varying responses to globalization? Researchers have argued—often in
contradiction to each other—that small states differ from larger states on economic,
social, and political factors. They may have higher per capita incomes and productivity
levels, and better human development indicators, yet have higher poverty and
inequality. They are also said to have greater economic openness, higher volatility in
growth rates, and higher levels of aid intensity per capita. A variety of studies on the
political aspects of smallness argue that small states in general tend to have greater
political centralization and possibly higher corruption levels. They also have larger
public sectors, weaker state capacity, higher unit cost of public services, and the
handicap of a much higher level of perceived investment risk than objective indicators
1 In results not presented, it is also possible to show that, since the late 1970s, small countries have
enjoyed a greater improvement in the quality of their institutions than large countries. The time-series
data on which this claim rests has been faulted by numerous critics (ourselves included), hence our
decision to exclude it from our analysis. This data is separate from that which we have employed
elsewhere in this paper.3
would suggest. Some researchers argue that small states are more flexible and can adjust
more quickly to rapid changes.
Studies of small states often ask the question: is small beautiful? Streeten’s 1993 review
is one of many that have ranked the evidence for and against this question. Streeten
argues that small states in general seem to depend more on the export of raw materials
and to lag behind larger states in the development of a manufacturing base (1993: 197).
Their greater openness and small size make an initial stage of import substitution
industrialization very difficult. But small countries even more than large need to take
advantage of the international economy. For them, exporting provides their only option
to capture economies of scale (198). However, Streeten suggests that small may be
beneficial: he also finds that small countries grow faster and have higher productivity
than larger countries, and he argues that small countries seem to be more equal,
‘indicating greater social cohesion’ (199). They also generally land better terms in
foreign aid: ‘one of the most well-established generalizations in the foreign assistance
field is the so-called small country effect, according to which aid per head increases,
and the terms of aid improve, as the size of the country declines’ (200). Streeten also
suggests that collective action problems may be solved more easily in small countries
where free-riding is more visible and people tend to know each other and meet face to
face (200). Their small size should also make many transaction costs lower: information
should flow more easily, and principal-agent problems should be fewer, with greater
ease of supervision. And although they may be more vulnerable to the risks of natural
disasters and trade instability, small countries may also be more flexible and resilient.
Easterly and Kraay (2000) also explored whether or not small states ‘suffer from their
smallness’ (2013). Controlling for OECD status, oil production, and location by
continent, Easterly and Kraay found that ‘microstates’ (those with populations under 1
million) are ‘richer and have higher productivity levels’ (2014) than large states. Small
states also have better infant mortality statistics, educational attainment, and life
expectancy (2017). The ratio of trade to GDP in these small states was 54 percentage
points above average, showing their high degree of openness (2018), yet microstates
were ‘not particularly open to financial flows’ (2024). Because of their relatively greater
external exposure and an accompanying instability in their terms of trade, microstates
(and possibly small states as well) tend to have growth rates that are much more volatile
than other states. Yet at least in the group of microstates studied by Easterly and Kraay,
this higher volatility does not lead to lower average growth rates for small states than
for larger states with less volatility, suggesting that something is compensating for these
swings in fortune.
In contrast to the optimistic conclusions of Easterly and Kraay, a study commissioned
by the Commonwealth Secretariat found that small countries (those with populations of
1.5 million and below) seem to have larger problems, in particular, higher poverty and
inequality, as well as greater vulnerability to shocks (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2000:
16). This may be a reflection of factors such as the fact that the widely dispersed
populations of some small island states are spread over a number of islands, while the
major economic activities are found mainly near the capital. In addition, they note that
many small states are located in hurricane-prone regions, or are subject to the threat of
volcanic eruptions.
Collier and Dollar (1999) examine the relationship among policies, growth and aid in
small states. They find that when poverty levels and population are controlled, small4
states (those with populations of five million and below) generally receive more aid, on
average, and that this aid does not seem to depend on the quality of their economic
policies. However, this aid may be helping small countries compensate for another
difference between small and large countries: an unwarranted perception of risk.
Ratings done by risk agencies consistently rank small countries as more risky for
investors than an objective review of their policy stance and history would support.
Most of the empirical research on the differences between small and large states has
explored differences in economic and social variables. However, researchers have noted
several possible differences in the way small and large states are governed, and the type
of institutions they have. Peter Katzenstein (1985) has argued with regard to the smaller
states in Western Europe ‘[s]ize affects … both economic openness and the
characteristics of the political regime’ (80) In small countries, Katzenstein continues,
‘political centralization tends to be greater and political arrangements tend to be more
closely knit’ (80). The small countries he examined all tended toward corporatist
political arrangements, integrating major stakeholders in important government policy
deliberations.
However, it is possible that these close-knit political arrangements and centralization
can lead to higher levels of corruption in small countries, as their officials may be more
accessible to clientelist and ‘old boy network’ pressures. Farrugia (1993) emphasizes
these potential side-effects of small scale in his exploration of the ‘special’ environment
faced by high level bureaucrats in very small states. He suggests that relationships are
more ‘closely knit’ and ‘highly personalized (221)’. Requests for patronage and special
treatment may be more frequent, since officials frequently run into people informally.
This may not necessary involve corruption; personal ties are likely to be stronger in
small states, but this may work toward moderate policies, particularly if people are
educated in the same schools and basically all know each other. In a similar vein,
Armstrong and Read (1998) point out that small states may have ‘a greater degree of
social homogeneity, cohesion, and identity which encourages the formation of social
capital… through the development of social and civic institutions’ (570). They also note
that these close ties may also promote clientelism and rent-seeking.
In general, small states tend to have proportionately larger governments. Public sector
wage bills in the Commonwealth Secretariat group of small countries were considerably
higher at 31 per cent of GDP than in larger states, which averaged 21 per cent of GDP
(Commonwealth Secretariat, 2000: 17). As the Commonwealth Secretariat study points
out, part of the explanation is likely to lie in the fact that small countries have few
economies of scale, which raises the cost of providing public services. However, the
economies of scale argument regarding the public sector is challenged by studies that do
not find a productivity disadvantage due to increasing returns to scale in the economy in
general (Easterly and Kraay 2000).
The larger public sectors found in small states could also be related to the fact that small
countries have more open economies. In general, countries that have more openness to
trade historically have larger, rather than smaller, public sectors, with the extra spending
required by efforts to cushion their citizens from the impact of greater volatility and the
risks associated with greater flexibility (Cameron 1978; Rodrik 1998b). These larger
public sectors may also be behind the seemingly superior ability of small states to adjust
to external shocks (Streeten 1993).5
Addressing the impact of volatility and risk requires a capable state, but research
suggests that in general, small countries may have weaker state capacity. The
Commonwealth Secretariat’s recent survey of the experience of small developing states
with populations under 1.5 million found that the weak state capacity they observed was
probably related to the special problems faced by small countries (2000: 17). Small
countries may have smaller pools of qualified people to select from in staffing their
bureaucracies (Streeten 1993). As noted above, small countries receive
disproportionately more aid, but high levels of aid intensity have been correlated with
poor quality of state institutions, an effect that holds even when economic decline is
controlled (Bräutigam 2000a). This might disproportionately affect the quality of
governance in small countries that receive high levels of aid. When combined with
poverty, low levels of public sector capacity (whether or not aid is involved) may create
a vicious circle for small countries, particularly when it constrains their ability to
influence the outcome of negotiations over the terms of their participation in the new
financial and trade architecture (IMF, WTO) that will ‘profoundly affect’ their trade-
dependent economies (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2000: 18).
2 Why might some small states succeed at globalization?
Small states succeed at globalization when they are able to combine economic
competitiveness, continual innovation, and increasingly higher value-added production,
with reductions in poverty and improvements in key socio-economic indicators such as
health, longevity, literacy, and social violence. While inequality may rise when those
with more desirable (and scarcer) skills are able to bargain successfully for higher
wages, distributive policies in successful globalizers will soften the social impact of
glaring inequality.
As with large countries, small countries with macroeconomic stability, open to the skills
and innovation benefits possible from joint ventures, and some kinds of foreign direct
investment, are likely to do better than others at integrating with the global economy.
Yet compared with the variety of studies that try to determine how small and large
states differ, there is much less empirical research on the reasons why some small states
do better than others. A study by Armstrong and Read (1998) reports that regional
location constitutes the principal explanation of growth performance among small
states. Having abundant natural resources, and strong financial and tourism sectors, also
were important for growth, while having a large agricultural sector tended to work
against economic growth. Their study did not consider performance in areas other than
growth.
Study after study has documented the greater vulnerability and openness of small
countries compared with large. Smallness clearly provides the extra challenge of
maintaining social stability in the context of the more volatile environment they face by
being highly trade-dependent. In general, the quality of state institutions can go far in
explaining the variety of growth and human development performance found in
developing countries. Two kinds of political institutions seem particularly important:
those that reflect higher levels of state capacity, and those that manage social conflicts.
There are many reasons to think that these kinds of institutions might make even more
of a difference in the ability of small and vulnerable states to manage the impact of
globalization.6
2.1 State capacity
The rise of the East Asian ‘miracle’ focused attention on the quality of state
intervention, not merely whether the state intervened or not (Wade 1990; Evans 1995).
Recently, this theme has been revisited with the much longer time series data now
available on developing countries, and the compilation of several new indicator sets that
give measures of bureaucratic quality, rule of law, and corruption. Research by Knack
and Keefer (1995), and more recently by Campos and Nugent (1999), suggests that
bureaucratic quality and other governance indicators are important in explaining
growth. In a related study, Fedderke and Klitgaard found that ‘higher [bureaucratic]
efficiency is associated with higher educational levels, lower levels of land and income
inequality, and lower ethnolinguistic fractionation’ (1998: 472). Easterly’s (2000) work
has shown that good institutions can help mediate the latent social conflicts associated
with ethnic and economic inequality. Econometric research at the World Bank suggests
that the influence of high quality public institutions may exceed the impact of good
economic policies in explaining development performance (proxied using growth and
reductions in infant mortality) (World Bank 1997a).
Effective state institutions are likely to be critical in mediating the impact of
globalization in small developing countries. A well-working bureaucracy is important
for formulating and implementing economic and social policies. Such policies enable
countries to upgrade their skill bases, manage their interactions with foreign investors
and sources of technology, negotiate better packages in trade agreements such as the
WTO or the Lomé Convention, and devise ways to cushion their populations from the
instability that accompanies openness.
2.2 Reducing social conflict and instability
A second strong theme in the literature on successful globalizers is the importance of
institutions that ameliorate the social impact of instability and mediate conflicts. Among
the institutions that might have this effect are democratic rules that enable countries to
‘institutionalize’ their conflicts through the democratic system, while affording various
important social groups a voice in the decisions about adjustment. Other important
institutions are likely to be those that protect human rights; the rule of law; greater
equality (through land access, or redistributive taxation); and social insurance.
Early examples of these kinds of institutions can be found in the small social
democracies of Europe. Forced to be highly open to trade and capital flows by their
small size, Europe’s small countries concentrated on enhancing their ability to adjust
flexibly to external conditions, while protecting their populations from the insecurity
generated by continual adjustment. As Peter Katzenstein puts it, ‘elites in the small
European states, while letting international markets force economic adjustments, choose
a variety of economic and social policies that prevent the costs of change from causing
political eruptions. They live with change by compensating for it’ (1985: 24).
Compensating for change in Europe’s small countries required a larger but more
‘nimble’ state, better social protection, and a capable bureaucracy to implement
strategies of continual adjustment. A number of studies have found that states that are
more open to trade also have larger governments, presumably to manage, and7
compensate for the costs of, continual adjustment (Rodrik 1998b). In a recent article,
Art Goldsmith (1999) argues that the African states with the largest public sectors,
Botswana and Mauritius, are also two of the continent’s most consistently good
performers. Small countries with more activist states may be better able to cushion the
social impact of vulnerability.
In a series of recent publications, Rodrik (1998a; 1999; 2000) demonstrates the
importance of the institutions states use to manage conflict, and links this to their ability
to successfully navigate economic shocks. Rodrik uses indicators for 'the quality of
governmental institutions, rule of law, democratic rights, and social safety nets' to
represent institutions of conflict management. These institutions establish the rules and
practices that can soften the distributional impact of the adjustment required by external
shocks, and seem to have allowed countries with rules already in place to adjust more
rapidly (and, presumably, equitably). A related factor might be that stronger social
protections engender more trust in the government and its ability to protect their basic
needs. This could reinforce ‘social capital’ (Woolcock 2000) and help to underpin
adjustment with stability (and a human face).
While democratic polities in general do not preside over faster growing economies, they
are able to provide more stability in growth rates over time (Rodrik 2000) and ensure
lower levels of inequality. The lessons of this study remain highly relevant today. As
Rodrik (1998a: 28) concludes in his review of the adjustment experience of the 1970s:
An increasing number of developing countries are integrating themselves with the
international economy. As the Asian financial crisis demonstrates vividly, this will
increase their exposure to shocks. Therefore, it will be all the more important to develop
institutions that mediate social conflicts. The results of this paper indicate that
participatory and democratic institutions, the rule of law, and social insurance are all
components of a strategy to enhance resilience to volatility in the external environment.
Is this true as well of small developing countries? In the next section we attempt to find
out.
3 Data analysis
The preceding discussion lays a foundation for exploring the nature and extent of
empirical differences between small and large countries, and for testing our arguments
pertaining to the importance of institutions that enhance state capacity and conflict
management. Here we revisit some of the questions regarding the differences between
small and large countries, and explore some of the possible explanations for differences
among small countries themselves.
There is little agreement over what actually constitutes a ‘small’ country. Recent
research by Easterly and Kraay (2000: 2014) on ‘microstates’ includes those ‘having an
average population over the period 1960-1995 of less than one million’. Others have
used population figures of one and a half million (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2000);
three million (Armstrong and Read 1998); five million (Collier and Dollar (1999), and
ten million (Kuznets 1960; Streeten 1993). We use the figure of five million (1998
population) as our cut-off, since this is approximately the median population of all8
countries in the world. Globalization we define as integration with the global economy,
as measured by trade as a proportion of GDP, trade openness, and direct foreign
investment. We also consider the ‘quality’ (as opposed to the ‘quantity’) of
globalization, as measured by the degree to which exports are based on manufacturing
(rather than resource extraction).
The major contribution of this paper is its exploration of governance variables as a
possible explanation of the differences between small and large countries, and among
small countries. We consider the quality of governance using a comprehensive
aggregated data set recently compiled by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (KKZ)
(1999). These authors have compiled six measures of governance: ‘Voice and
accountability’; ‘Political instability’; ‘Rule of law’; ‘Government effectiveness’;
‘Controlling corruption’; and ‘Regulatory burden’. We examine each of these
dimensions to discern whether there are differences in governance between small and
large states.
We then further develop two broad categories of governance—Conflict Management
and State Capacity—that we propose are vital for countries seeking to negotiate the
challenges and opportunities of globalization. Various plausible measures can be
proposed for each of the two aspects of governance. Conflict management refers to
institutions such as democracy, human rights, free press, collective bargaining
arrangements, social programs, and rule of law, which collectively entail clear
procedures, mechanisms for information dissemination, support for weaker groups, and
independent forums in and through which differences can be resolved. On the basis of
their comprehensiveness, we have selected ‘voice and accountability’ and ‘rule of law’
from the KKZ list of variables to best measure conflict management. Proxies for state
capacity could include size of government, absence of corruption, quality of
bureaucracy, and nature and size of national tax base. We have selected two aggregated
variables from KKZ—‘government effectiveness’ and ‘controlling corruption’ (again,
for reasons of comprehensiveness)—to best capture state capacity.
Our dependent variable is development performance in small states in a context of
increased globalization. By ‘development performance’ we mean the trajectory and
stability of economic growth rates attained over the 1960-98 period. We also examine
various measures of education (primary and secondary enrolment) and health (life
expectancy and under-five mortality). Details of the specific data used are provided in
Appendix 1.
We begin by examining 24 different social, economic, and governance variables,
gathered from a sample of 102 small and 105 large countries2 (a population of 5 million
in 1998 being the cut-off point). These variables are presented in Table 1, and show
that, on the face of it, small countries have:
2 Technically these countries should actually be called ‘economies’ since the full data set includes
overseas territories such as Reunion. In most of the substantive calculations, however, data was only
available for bona fide countries, so we have retained that term throughout our analysis and
discussion.9
* higher economic inequality * higher levels of foreign investment
* slower improvement in primary education * higher trade quantity
* lower child mortality rates * lower trade quality
* longer life expectancy * higher growth volatility
* higher levels of foreign aid * more political stability
* stronger rule of law and *less corruption than large countries.
Of course, these differences in means may not be a function of size per se, but rather
some other factors. We can test for this using simple regression analysis. Accordingly,
Tables 2a presents results from regression analysis on the socio-economic variables,
controlling for initial level of development, rate of economic growth, and regional
dummies; Table 2b does the same for the governance variables, but also controlling for
land inequality and ethnic fractionalization (joint proxies for social divisions). This
analysis whittles down the number of variables on which small countries actually differ
from large countries to:
* growth volatility * foreign direct investment
* trade quantity * trade quality, and
* foreign aid.
This suggests that while governance per se is not significantly better or worse in small
countries, it nevertheless still matters a lot, given that small countries have a
demonstrably more volatile relationship with the global economy than large countries. It
can reasonably be argued that the high growth volatility of small countries is directly
related to the nature and extent of their engagement with the global economy.
In the next stage of the analysis—Table 3—we investigate whether growth volatility,
foreign direct investment, and foreign aid remain high in small countries, even after
controlling for initial wealth, economic inequality, economic growth, globalization
(trade quality and quantity), regional dummies, and two sets of governance variables—
Conflict Management, measured by the ‘voice and accountability’ and ‘rule of law’
variables, and State Capacity, measured by the ‘government effectiveness’ and ‘control
of corruption’ variables.
The results show that, controlling for quality of institutions in addition to standard
socio-economic variables, small states remain significantly different from large
countries on just two dimensions: growth volatility and aid share. In these regressions,
growth volatility is shown to be negatively related to country size and positively related
to the absence of democratic decision-making institutions. Levels of direct foreign
investment are positively related to levels of trade and government effectiveness (the
sub-Saharan Africa dummy is strongly negatively significant, suggesting a conspicuous
anti-Africa bias on the part of foreign investors). Foreign aid flows are allocated as one
might initially expect—primarily to small, poor, slow-growing, high-trade economies—
but, despite their rhetoric regarding the importance of human rights and anti-corruption,
donors seem largely indifferent to the quality of government in the countries to which10
they lend: if anything, they give to more democratic countries, but not to those with
strong rule of law, who are less corrupt, or have high-quality public institutions. Our
results suggest that donors would likely see a greater return on their ‘investments’ if
they allocated resources to those small countries seriously trying to bring about positive
improvements in their quality of governance.
In the final series of regressions, we restrict our sample just to small countries. Because
the number of countries with full data is rather small at this level, the four institutional
variables are entered separately into the various regressions (since they are naturally
somewhat correlated with one another). Again, however, we see that institutions of
conflict management and state capacity matter. Small countries with superior state
capacity (controlling for initial wealth, inequality, region, and levels of globalization)
have higher growth rates (Table 4a), while all four conflict management and state
capacity variables are positively related to growth stability (Table 4b). Importantly,
foreign investors seem indifferent to the quality of institutions in small countries (none
of the institutional quality variables is significant for FDI; results not shown), whereas
aid donors seem to actively seek bad institutional environments (Table 4c). An
optimistic reading of this result is that donors are giving money to these countries in the
hope of strengthening their institutional infrastructure; a more pessimistic—and
arguably more realistic—interpretation is that considerable sums of tax-payer funds and
private donations are being squandered in less-than-optimal institutional environments.
Either way, it is clear that investors and donors alike would better serve both their own
interests and those of their clients in poor small countries if they took more serious
consideration of the institutional quality prevailing in the countries in which they are
operating (or would like to operate).
4 Case studies
How might small countries develop superior institutions, and how can these institutions
help them ameliorate vulnerability and take advantage of opportunity? Quantitative
cross-country comparisons are useful in many respects, but they are less helpful in
addressing these types of questions. In this section we briefly compare three small
countries, Mauritius, Jamaica, and Sierra Leone. All three fall into the same ‘higher
medium vulnerability’ category, according to the Commonwealth Secretariat. Yet all
three have dealt differently with the risks and opportunities presented by their openness
and geography. Given space considerations, we can examine only very superficially the
presence and not the workings of the major institutions hypothesized to help ameliorate
the impact of vulnerability, as they comprise aspects of state capacity and conflict
management. Clearly there are many other factors that might be affecting performance
in these countries, but our purpose is to illustrate a plausible story that focuses on
institutions. First, we establish the development performance for each country since
1970. Given different starting points, we establish this performance as the difference
between levels in 1970 and in 1997. Then, we explore which relevant governance
institutions were established in each country, over time, and finally we discuss the
extent to which these stories conform with our hypotheses.
We need to introduce these cases with a brief discussion of the decisions each country
made regarding the economic policies that promote efficient globalization. These vary
sharply. Mauritius had far less government ownership of the economy, compared with11
Jamaica. Both had intervention, but in Mauritius it was generally targeted toward
improving the country’ position in its global interactions, or toward improving the
equitable distribution of the fruits of globalization. In contrast, Jamaica’ stance toward
globalization has been characterized as “unfocused… merely following to a limited
extent world economic fashion” (King 2000). Sierra Leone in contrast did little either to
intervene effectively, or to promote private investment. In particular, the three countries
also made different decisions regarding strategies of manufacturing for export, one of
the possible pathways out of the extreme vulnerabilities suffered by countries that are
inherently small, and dependent on commodity exports. The decision the government in
Mauritius made to use its abundant unemployed labor in labor-intensive manufacturing
for export, while underwriting social security for the population in general, has been key
to the island’s success, as was its early and successful stabilization after the economic
turmoil of the late 1970s and early 1980s. Jamaica, on the other hand, has been a
“reluctant reformer” (King 2000) with sluggish growth rates and far less structural
change. Governments in Sierra Leone have done almost nothing to improve the quality
of the country’s global economic links.
As for development performance, as Table 5 shows, all three countries have
experienced improvements in life expectancy and infant mortality since 1970, with
Jamaicans gaining double the number of years gained by Sierra Leoneans, and
Mauritians tripling the latter’s gains. Mauritius also had far greater improvement on
infant mortality, although by 1997, Jamaica had the lower rate. On income per capita
measures expressed in 1987 US$, both Jamaica and Sierra Leone have declined since
1975, while Mauritius has more than doubled its real GDP per capita. Economic
policies are certainly central to the stories here. But can the differences in the ability of
these three countries to manage their vulnerability be partly explained through variance
in the institutions of state capacity and conflict management?
State Capacity. One aspect of state capacity is the ability of the state to assure domestic
and foreign investors that it will carry out its financial obligations. One way to explore
this is through credit ratings given by firms like Institutional Investor, which rates
countries from 0 (low) to 100 (World Bank 1997a). A glance at the credit ratings for
1981-83 suggests that Mauritius (at 19.0 compared with Switzerland's 95.2) was only
marginally above Jamaica (at 15.9), while Sierra Leone stood at 8.2. Over the next ten
years, however, Mauritius improved its rating by an average 2.34 points per year, the
most dramatic improvement of all the rated countries. Jamaica also improved, but only
by 0.77 points per year, while Sierra Leone declined at an average -0.09 points per year.
While this is a narrow view of state capacity, it does suggest that Mauritius’s ability to
manage its economic affairs, and therefore its vulnerability, is likely to be superior to
the other two.
State capacity is also affected by the broad quality of the educational system that feeds
graduates into the bureaucracy. In 1980, fifteen years or so after independence,
Mauritius had a 93 per cent primary enrollment, and 50 per cent secondary. Jamaica was
even better, at 103 per cent primary enrollment, and 67 per cent secondary. But Sierra
Leone was enrolling only 54 per cent in primary school, and only 14 per cent in
secondary (World Bank 1997a). Both Jamaica and Mauritius had a sufficient base from
which to draw their civil servants, while the base in Sierra Leone was much thinner.
Conflict Management. The second set of institutions are those that should help countries
manage the conflicts engendered by globalization. Here we look primarily at democratic12
decision making, but also at instruments of social policy, as reflected in levels of
household inequality, and social insurance.
All three countries were once British colonies, and all three have experienced
substantial and gradual enlargement of suffrage and inclusion of local people in
governance. Jamaica had a long history of representative government, dating from the
18th century. Legislative council elections were held in Mauritius in 1886, although the
franchise was severely limited. Sierra Leone held its first legislative council elections in
1924, electing Africans to the council (Collier, 1982, 39). At independence, all three
adopted democratic constitutions. Mauritius (independent in 1968) and Jamaica
(independent in 1962) maintained their democracies over time, despite some rough
spots. Sierra Leone had a lively multiparty competition until 1978, when an
authoritarian leadership adopted a new constitution, making Sierra Leone a single party
state.
Since 1972-73, Mauritius has averaged ‘1’ on the Freedom House measure of political
liberties, and ‘2’ on the Freedom House measure of civil liberties, the same score held
by the United Kingdom, making it among the most ‘democratic’ of small developing
countries (Freedom House, 2000). Over the same period, Jamaica averaged a more
modest but still low ‘2’ on political liberties and ‘3’ on civil liberties, while Sierra
Leone has averaged ‘5’ on political liberties and ‘5’ on civil liberties. If democratic
institutions help ameliorate the impact of trade liberalization and engagement with the
global economy, Mauritius should benefit the most, while Sierra Leone should find little
help.
To what extent did institutions in each country ameliorate or reinforce inequality,
another possible aspect of conflict management? Again, data is poor in this area, and we
have no data at all for Sierra Leone. We have figures on Gini coefficients of income
inequality for Jamaica from 1991: 41.1, and from Mauritius, where income inequality
was reduced during the 1980s, resulting in a household Gini coefficient of 37 in (year).
Both of these are relatively low, particularly when compared with small Latin American
countries such as Nicaragua (50.3) and Panama (56.6). In Mauritius, the idea of equality
and equity has been honored, not just given lip-service, by political leaders, who
emphasize social justice as one component of their strategy for balancing a complicated
multi-ethnic society. Jamaica has shifted between a stronger socialist approach (under
Michael Manley's People's National Party (PNP), 1972 to 1980) and a more
conservative approach under the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) led by Edward Seaga,
1980-1989. The reelection of the PNP in 1988 continued many of the moderate policies
of Seaga. For most of their post-independence histories, Mauritius and Jamaica have
been governed by parties that emphased ideas of social justice and moderate
redistribution, and that put considerable resources into social spending. Sierra Leone’s
leadership was not generally so disposed.
An effective social safety net is a final component of a system of conflict management.
Unfortunately, we lack quantitative data to compare each country’s history of social
insurance. Studies suggest, however, that Mauritius and Jamaica have had a relatively
long history of social protections, while the safety net in Sierra Leone depended on
subsidies and controls on the price of rice sold in the urban areas, a feature that served
to keep the price low for rural producers. In Mauritius, social expenditures (education,
health, universal old age pensions, housing and social assistance, and food subsidies)
absorb about 40 per cent of government spending, and this pattern has lasted for four13
decades or more (Bräutigam 2000b). Mauritius has a compulsory contributory pension
system, and in 1983, the country passed an unemployment relief act that provided
minimum, means-tested payments to unemployed heads of households. Social services
in Jamaica make up a smaller percentage of public expenditure, averaging 31 per cent
between 1980 and 1998 (King 2000: 31).
These three cases suggest the broad differences between countries that are similarly
vulnerable to the risks and open to the opportunities in the global economy. Full
exploration of these cases would no doubt reveal many factors to explain the different
development outcomes. Economic policy choices certainly differed strongly, and this is
a fundamental aspect of development outcomes. But it is also clear that Mauritius, as the
most successful ‘globalizer’ of the group, also had the strongest institutions, particularly
those reflecting levels of state capacity, and of ability to manage social conflicts.
5 Conclusion
Small countries will remain vulnerable to an unpredictable global economy. But while
they cannot control the winds of economic fortune that beat at their borders, they do
have some control over the shape of their own domestic rules and institutions. Control is
a relative term, however. Our results suggest that high quality institutions can make a
difference in the ability of small countries to manage the threats and opportunities of
globalization. But if we are certain of one thing about institutions, it is that they change
slowly. Still, the trend over the past twenty years has been one of moving the state out,
reducing the role of government. The preliminary results of this project suggest that as
much or more attention needs to be paid to the reasons why so many states have poor
capacity, and the ways in which state capacity can be strengthened.
We also need much more creative thinking about they ways in which states can manage
their societal conflicts, create trust in their institutions, and maintain their ability to
protect their vulnerable populations from the instability that accompanies openness. The
European experience is one that should be studied for its possible lessons for today's
small countries. Small countries in Europe combined economic flexibility and openness
with democracy and social insurance. Yet these successful strategies may be difficult to
replicate today in many developing countries. There is always a trade-off, and in this
instance, the trade-off came from higher taxes to finance social protections for flexible
workers. Under relentless pressure to remain competitive and to trim their spending,
even Europe's social democracies are finding that the demands of integration are putting
pressure on their social safety nets.
There are a number of problematic methodological issues that surround research on
small states in the developing world (Knack and Azfar 2000), but evidence from a
variety of sources and approaches strongly suggests that institutional quality matters in
large and small countries alike. It matters even more in small countries, however, given
their high degree of exposure to—and weakened power to influence—the turbulence of
the global economy. Small countries with high quality institutions appear to manage
these risks and opportunities in ways that yield higher rates of economic growth and
stability, and thus social development. Foreign aid donors and investors seeking to make
a difference and a profit should therefore focus more judiciously on institutional quality
issues.14
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Summary of Differences Between Large and Small States
Variable N Mean SD Variable N Mean SD
Size (> < 5M in 1998) Initial GDP/c (ppp)
Large 108 Large 98 2562.49 2655.70
Small 102 Small 72 3153.76 3793.73
Region (dummy) Annual growth rate
SS Africa 49 Large 99 1.46 2.73
E Asia/Pac 35 Small 76 1.38 2.49
Ethnic fractionalization Growth volatility
Large 84 42.56 30.94 Large 99 4.63 2.34
Small 29 38.31 26.41 Small 76 6.57** 4.18
Economic inequality Aid (% GDP)
Large 95 38.87 9.51 Large 84 5.97 8.39
Small 46 42.83** 9.85 Small 81 12.92** 17.69
Land inequality FDI (% GDP)
Large 72 63.56 16.24 Large 96 1.36 1.70
Small 38 66.91 15.69 Small 75 3.08** 3.76
Primary education Trade quantity (% GDP)
Large 90 82.95 21.79 Large 99 62.60 35.94
Small 54 83.72 18.41 Small 75 108.78***46.80
Improving primary ed. Trade quality (dummy)
Large 88 5.44 16.47 Large 100 0.44 0.50
Small 50 0.38** 12.44 Small 79 0.28** 0.45
Secondary education Voice & accountability
Large 87 61.66 24.65 Large 107 -0.06 1.00
Small 52 66.21 20.15 Small 66 0.11 0.89
Improving secondary ed. Political instability
Large 86 10.83 20.28 Large 102 -0.12 0.96
Small 49 7.22 24.91 Small 53 0.17* 0.86
Mortality (<5 years) Government effectiveness
Large 105 82.13 74.63 Large 102 -0.08 0.96
Small 85 60.65** 64.38 Small 54 0.11 0.75
Mortality decline Regulatory burden
Large 96 -52.64 20.00 Large 106 -0.00 0.86
Small 54 -53.78 18.46 Small 60 0.01 0.79
Life expectancy Rule of law
Large 106 63.31 11.01 Large 106 -0.08 0.94
Small 91 66.08* 9.64 Small 60 0.15+ 0.88
Improving life exp. Control of corruption
Large 103 13.65 8.69 Large 102 -0.09 0.94
Small 91 12.52 8.23 Small 53 0.16* 0.81
+ p<0.07 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001
See Appendix for explanations of data.Table 2a
Socio-Economic Development Variables and Country Size
Dependent Economic Primary Under 5 Life Growth FDI Trade Trade Aid
variables• inequality education mortality expectancy volatility (log) quantity quality share
(log Gini) (% increase) rate (log) (log) (log) (log) (dummy) (log)
Independent
variables
Small state 0.11 -3.37 0.02 0.009 0.36 0.82 0.59 -0.23 1.48
(dummy) (2.60)* (1.26) (0.28) (0.67) (4.49)*** (4.05)*** (8.22)*** (3.60)*** (6.77)***
Initial GDP/c -0.05 -2.34 -0.73 0.09 -0.08 0.001 0.09 0.12 -1.53
(PPP) (log) (2.16)* (1.53) (14.59)*** (10.91)*** (1.77) (0.01) (2.00)* (3.14)** (10.92)***
Table 2a, Continued…
Median growth 0.005 0.46 -0.10 0.01 -0.06 0.04 -0.002 0.07 -0.16
rate (0.58) (0.64) (6.13)*** (5.09)*** (3.89)*** (0.92) (0.17) (4.80)*** (3.78)***
S-S Africa 0.13 2.63 0.64 -0.19 -0.06 -0.87 -0.04 -0.28 0.37
(dummy) (2.18)* (0.70) (5.46)*** (10.35)*** (0.58) (3.09)** (0.39) (3.05)** (1.31)
E Asia / Pacific 0.008 -3.16 0.001 -0.02 -0.09 0.24 0.12 -0.14 -0.09
(dummy) (0.13) (1.44) (0.01) (1.03) (0.73) (0.77) (1.08) (1.43) (0.27)
N = 130 128 164 170 170 152 164 157 148
R
2 = 0.201 0.080 0.778 0.779 0.182 0.207 0.343 0.360 0.603
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses
• These nine variables are those that show statistically significant differences (p<0,05) between the means of large and small countries (see Table 1).Table 2b
Governance Variables and Country Size
Dependent variables• Political instability Rule of law Control of
corruption
Independent variables
Small state 0.202 0.096 0.239
(dummy) (1.11) (0.60) (1.38)
Log of initial 0.574 0.617 0.735
GDP/c (PPP) (6.28)*** (7.57)*** (8.44)***
Land inequality -0.925 -1.256 -1.22
(log) (3.07)** (4.61)*** (4.36)***
Ethno-linguistic -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
fractionalization (0.55) (0.78) (0.27)
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.364 -0.307 0.061
(dummy) (1.38) (1.34) (0.24)
East Asia / Pacific 0.224 0.350 0.156
(dummy) (0.86) (1.47) (0.63)
N = 77 80 77
R
2 = 0.575 0.649 0.650
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses
• These three variables are those that otherwise show statistically significant differences (p<0,05) between
the means of large and small countries (see Table 1).Table 3
Development Variables Regressions
Dependent Variable Growth Foreign direct Aid
volatility (log) investment (log) share (log)
Socio-Eeconomic Variables
Small state (dummy) 0.451 (4.93)*** -0.060 (0.21) 0.952
(3.00)**
Initial GDP/c, PPP (log) 0.094 (1.61) -0.194 (1.14) -1.502
(7.67)***
Economic inequality (log) -0.269 (1.56) -0.024 (0.05) -0.369 (0.65)
Median growth rate -0.010 (0.42) -0.027 (0.39) -0.213
(2.67)**
Sub-Saharan Africa (dummy) 0.214 (1.92)+ -1.238 (3.87)*** 0.409 (1.13)
East Asia/Pacific (dummy) 0.043 (0.37) -0.113 (0.33) -1.011
(2.21)*
Globalization Variables
Trade quantity (log) 0.019 (0.25) 1.055 (4.48)*** 0.942
(3.13)**
Trade quality 0.157 (1.57) -0.499 (1.72) -0.227 (0.65)
Governance Variables
Conflict Management
Voice and accountability -0.173 (2.51)* 0.078 (0.37) 0.425
(1.91)+
Rule of law 0.065 (0.68) -0.062 (0.23) -0.060 (0.19)
State Capacity
Controlling Corruption -0.185 (1.43) -0.466 (1.22) -0.569 (1.20)
Government effectiveness -0.157 (1.15) 0.926 (2.32)* 0.277 (0.58)
N = 110 105 89
R
2 = 0.539 0.404 0.694
+ p<0.07 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001
Absolute value of t-statistic in parenthesesTable 4a
Economic Growth and Governance in Small Countries
Dependent Variables Economic Growth (median 1960-98)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Socio-Eeconomic Variables
Initial GDP/c, PPP (log) 0.226 (0.41) 0.091 (0.16) 0.461 (0.91) 0.564 (1.20)
Economic inequality (log) -0.761 (0.48) 0.104 (0.06) 0.972 (0.56) 1.002 (0.61)
Trade quantity (log) 0.604 (0.76) 0.120 (0.14) 1.074 (1.26) 1.143 (1.47)
Trade quality 0.745 (0.85) 0.865 (0.98) 0.432 (0.49) 0.350 (0.42)
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.344 (1.33) 0.814 (0.86) 1.126 (1.21) 1.294 (1.49)
East Asia/Pacific 1.730 (1.95)+ 1.353 (1.51) 0.366 (0.39) 0.339 (0.39)
Governance Variables
Conflict Management
Voice and accountability 0.651 (1.20)
Rule of law 0.682 (1.39)
State Capacity
Controlling corruption 0.879 (1.98)+
Government effectiveness 1.079 (2.43)*
N = 33 32 29 30
R
2 = 0.304 0.297 0.394 0.454
+ p<0.07 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 Absolute value of t-statistic in parenthesesTable 4b
Growth Volatility and Governance in Small Countries
Dependent Variables Growth Volatility (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Socio-Eeconomic Variables
Initial GDP/c, PPP (log) 0.175 (1.25) 0.257 (1.82) 0.144 (1.33) 0.067 (0.60)
Economic inequality (log) 0.474 (1.18) 0.122 (0.32) -0.051 (0.14) -0.088 (0.22)
Trade quantity (log) 0.096 (0.48) 0.213 (1.04) -0.044 (0.24) 0.069 (0.37)
Trade quality 0.260 (1.18) 0.282 (1.35) 0.382 (2.05)+ 0.337 (1.71)
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.270 (1.06) 0.173 (0.77) 0.136 (0.69) -0.057 (0.28)
East Asia/Pacific -0.447 (2.00)+ -0.181 (0.85) 0.105 (0.53) 0.010 (0.05)
Governance Variables
Conflict Management
Voice and accountability -0.403 (2.95)**
Rule of law -0.416 (3.58)**
State Capacity
Controlling corruption -0.501 (5.31)***
Government effectiveness -0.504 (4.75)***
N = 33 32 29 30
R
2 = 0.388 0.471 0.643 0.578
+ p<0.07 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 Absolute value of t-statistic in parenthesesTable 4c
Foreign Aid and Governance in Small Countries
Dependent Variables Aid Dependence (log of aid as share of GDP)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Socio-Eeconomic Variables
Initial GDP/c, PPP (log) -1.300 (2.94)** -1.071 (2.56)* -1.310 (3.56)** -1.489 (4.21)***
Economic inequality (log) 0.108 (0.08) -0.355 (0.30) 0.046 (0.04) 0.044 (0.04)
Trade quantity (log) 0.051 (0.08) 0.692 (1.02) 0.458 (0.71) 0.482 (0.81)
Trade quality -0.256 (0.37) -0.026 (0.04) 0.243 (0.39) 0.262 (0.44)
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.472 (0.57) -0.098 (0.15) -0.204 (0.32) -0.574 (0.94)
East Asia/Pacific -0.651 (0.85) -0.365 (0.53) 0.004 (0.01) -0.009 (0.01)
Governance Variables
Conflict Management
Voice and accountability -0.380 (0.84)
Rule of law -1.003 (2.39)*
State Capacity
Controlling corruption -1.340 (3.54)**
Government effectiveness -1.444 (3.78)***
N = 30 29 26 27
R
2 = 0.539 0.617 0.687 0.705
+ p<0.07 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 Absolute value of t-statistic in parenthesesTable 5
Case Study Country Comparisons
Factor Country: Jamaica Mauritius Sierra Leone
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Years added to life expectancy
at birth, 1970-1997 6.5 9.2 3.2
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reduction in deaths, infant
mortality rate, 1970-1997 37 44 24
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Infant mortality rate, 1997 10 20 182
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Change in GDP per capita
(1987 US$) 1975-1997 -152 1654 -97
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Average annual ranking,
political & civil liberties
Freedom House, 1972-99 2, 3 1, 2 5, 5
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Average spending on social
services, % total,
1 9 8 0 - 1 9 9 8 3 14 0n / a
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Adult literacy rate, 1998 86 84 31
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sources: United Nations Development Program (1999); World Bank (1997b), King (2000), Bräutigam (2000b).Appendix:
Explanation of Data and Sources
Many of the variables used in this paper come from the dataset on social cohesion,
institutions, and growth compiled for Ritzen, Easterly and Woolcock (2000), hereafter
REW. Where necessary they were supplemented by additional socio-economic data
maintained in the World Bank's World Development Indicators (World Bank 2000)
database. The exact description and source of each variable used in this paper are
outlined below.
Variable Description Source
Population As of 1998 World Bank (2000)
Ethnic fractionalization REW, originally from World Handbook of
Political and Social Indicators, 1972
Economic inequality Gini REW, supplemented with most
recent data from World Bank (2000)
Land inequality Deininger (1999)
Primary education World Bank (2000)
Secondary education World Bank (2000)
Under 5 mortality deaths per 1000 World Bank (2000)
Life expectancy World Bank (2000)
Initial GDP/c (ppp) REW
Annual growth rate Median of 1960-98 Derived from REW
Growth volatility SD of annual growth rate Derived from REW
A i ds h a r e %o fG D P W o r l dB a n k( 2 0 0 0 )
Foreign direct investment % of GDP World Bank (2000)
Trade quantity % of GDP World Bank (2000)
Trade quality dummy variable; 1 if World Bank (2000)
manufac. > 60% of exports
Voice and accountability KKZ (1999)
Political instability KKZ (1999)
Government effectiveness KKZ (1999)
Regulatory burden KKZ (1999)
Rule of law KKZ (1999)
Control of corruption KKZ (1999)UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU/WIDER)
was established by the United Nations University as its first research and
training centre and started work in Helsinki, Finland in 1985. The purpose of
the Institute is to undertake applied research and policy analysis on structural
changes affecting the developing and transitional economies, to provide a
forum for the advocacy of policies leading to robust, equitable and
environmentally sustainable growth, and to promote capacity strengthening
and training in the field of economic and social policy making. Its work is
carried out by staff researchers and visiting scholars in Helsinki and through
networks of collaborating scholars and institutions around the world.
UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU/WIDER)
Katajanokanlaituri 6 B, 00160 Helsinki, Finland
Camera-ready typescript prepared by Anna Kervinen at UNU/WIDER
Printed at UNU/WIDER, Helsinki
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s). Publication does not imply
endorsement by the Institute or the United Nations University, nor by the programme/project sponsors, of
any of the views expressed.
ISSN 1609-5774
ISBN 952-455-198-5 (printed publication)
ISBN 952-455-199-3 (internet publication)